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1
1.1

Assessing the Normativity of Human Rights Claims1
Introduction
The existence of human rights is sometimes taken as a “fact of the world.”2 Such rights, if

grounded, would supply agents with reasons to act on the demands they entail. Those who
assert that human rights exist, however, disagree on what grounds human rights as normative
claims. In this chapter I examine Allen Buchanan’s idealized, morally grounded, naturalistic
account.
1.2

Considering a Moral Foundation of Human Rights
Buchanan, seeking to address shortcomings in the present system of international law,

argues for the adoption of an idealized system based on moral principles. Buchanan implies that
international human rights law currently does not recognize the inherent value of human life
because the law is not grounded in systematic moral theory. Buchanan argues that deliberate
moral reasoning is needed to create a “mutually supporting set of prescriptive principles”3 which
can inform any substantial legal guidance on issues of human rights.
Justice is prominent among the prescriptive principles of Buchanan’s system because it
is fundamental to a morally grounded account of international law: “principles of justice specify
the most basic moral rights and obligations that persons have.”4 All institutions with the power
to affect people, Buchanan insists, “must be designed to function in conformity with principles
of justice.”5 International law, acting as one such institution, must also be evaluated by the

I am grateful to my amazing proofreaders, Katy Fulfer and Elizabeth Victor for their comments on earlier
drafts of this work.
2 Charles R. Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 1, quoting
Richard Rorty.
3 Allen E. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 15
4 Ibid.., p.1.
5 Ibid..
1
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standards of justice. If justice informed the practice of international law, Buchanan believes the
norms endorsed by law would become more just. Consequently, he hopes just legal practice
would result in improved treatment of people. Principles of justice “ascribe basic and relatively
uncontroversial rights to all persons as such,”6 which are taken to include basic human rights on
Buchanan’s account. Accordingly, justice serves as a morally obligatory “primary goal of
international law;” the content of this goal arises from “a conception of basic human rights.”7
Though moral precepts underpin all human rights, legal human rights are distinct from
moral human rights, which are to be understood as a subset of moral claim rights that “have two
essential elements: a permission or liberty and a correlative obligation”8 not to infringe it. These
obligations are not absolute, but “have special priority” on agents’ actions and apply to all
persons simply because they are persons. Moral human rights, unlike legal human rights, “exist
independently of whether they are enshrined in legal rules or not.”9 Furthermore, human rights
as moral rights “have meaning independent of any particular legal system [and] are able to serve
as a critical touchstone for reforming the law.”10
Legal human rights, by contrast, are those rights actually recognized by law and upheld
by institutions and legal procedures. These rights may not always correspond directly to an
underlying moral human right. Granting state legitimacy on this account ought to be contingent
on the state’s upholding at least legal human rights. Buchanan cautions that recognizing a state
as legitimate must be “supported by legal principles that require the state to satisfy certain
minimal standards of justice.”11 Upholding minimal standards of justice entails requiring and
protecting certain forms of governance under international law, if we accept Buchanan’s
account. Specifically, he contends that a human right to democracy must be recognized by
international law. I contend Buchanan is mistaken in his belief. I return to this point in
Ibid., p. 4
Ibid., p. 61
8 Ibid., p. 123
9 Ibid., p. 119
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., p. 6
6
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subsequent discussions. If a nation is recognized by the global order as legitimate only when it
complies with minimal standards of justice, and if principles of justice specify persons’ most
basic moral rights and obligations, then even merely legal human rights in a legitimate state
have a moral foundation.
1.3

The Universality of Moral Human Rights
Buchanan, seeking to address shortcomings in the present system of international law,

argues for the adoption of an idealized system based on moral principles. Buchanan implies that
international human rights law currently does not recognize the inherent value of human life
because the law is not grounded in systematic moral theory. Buchanan argues that deliberate
moral reasoning is needed to create a “mutually supporting set of prescriptive principles”12
which can inform any substantial legal guidance on issues of human rights.
Justice is prominent among the prescriptive principles of Buchanan’s system because it
is fundamental to a morally grounded account of international law: “principles of justice specify
the most basic moral rights and obligations that persons have.”13 All institutions with the power
to affect people, Buchanan insists, “must be designed to function in conformity with principles
of justice.”14 International law, acting as one such institution, must also be evaluated by the
standards of justice. If justice informed the practice of international law, Buchanan believes the
norms endorsed by law would become more just. Consequently, he hopes just legal practice
would result in improved treatment of people. Principles of justice “ascribe basic and relatively
uncontroversial rights to all persons as such,”15 which are taken to include basic human rights
on Buchanan’s account. Accordingly, justice serves as a morally obligatory “primary goal of
international law;” the content of this goal arises from “a conception of basic human rights.”16

Ibid., p. 15
Ibid., p. 1
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 4
16 Ibid., p. 61
12
13
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Though moral precepts underpin all human rights, legal human rights are distinct from
moral human rights, which are to be understood as a subset of moral claim rights that “have two
essential elements: a permission or liberty and a correlative obligation”17 not to infringe it. These
obligations are not absolute, but “have special priority” on agents’ actions and apply to all
persons simply because they are persons. Moral human rights, unlike legal human rights, “exist
independently of whether they are enshrined in legal rules or not.”18 Furthermore, human rights
as moral rights “have meaning independent of any particular legal system [and] are able to serve
as a critical touchstone for reforming the law.”19
Legal human rights, by contrast, are those rights actually recognized by law and upheld
by institutions and legal procedures. These rights may not always correspond directly to an
underlying moral human right. Granting state legitimacy on this account ought to be contingent
on the state’s upholding at least legal human rights. Buchanan cautions that recognizing a state
as legitimate must be “supported by legal principles that require the state to satisfy certain
minimal standards of justice.”20 Upholding minimal standards of justice entails requiring and
protecting certain forms of governance under international law, if we accept Buchanan’s
account. Specifically, he contends that a human right to democracy must be recognized by
international law. I contend Buchanan is mistaken in his belief. I return to this point in
subsequent discussions. If a nation is recognized by the global order as legitimate only when it
complies with minimal standards of justice, and if principles of justice specify persons’ most
basic moral rights and obligations, then even merely legal human rights in a legitimate state
have a moral foundation.

Ibid., p. 123
Ibid., p. 119
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., p. 6
17

18
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1.4

Basic Human Rights
An interest should be protected by a human right, Buchanan argues, if it satisfies certain

criteria: it must be indispensable enough to “warrant extraordinary protection”; it must be an
interest of all persons; and there must be “institutional arrangements” capable of protecting the
interest that are “reasonably effective.”21 According to this model, “human rights norms
[express] basic moral values that place constraints on institutional arrangements.”22 Buchanan
believes that the interests that ought to be protected by basic human rights are those that are
common to all persons as “condition[s] for a decent human life.”23 A decent human life is not
equivalent to a flourishing human life or the best human life. The conditions necessary to a
decent human life are minimal and depend on “what human beings are, and more importantly
what they are capable of.”24
In illustrating the importance of respecting what human beings are capable of,
Buchanan turns to Martha Nussbaum’s “capabilities view.”25 Buchanan’s conception of a decent
human life incorporates and further develops the ideas initially offered by Nussbaum’s view.
Nussbaum asserts
First, that certain functions are central in human life… that is, their presence or
absence is typically understood as the presence or absence of human life, and
second… that there is something that it is to do these functions in a truly human
way, not a merely animal way.26
As Buchanan understands Nussbaum’s view, “principles of international law should
foster the capabilities of every person to exercise [their] distinctive central human functions.”27
Accordingly, respecting moral and legal human rights, on Nussbaum’s view, requires the

Ibid., p. 119
Ibid., p. 127
23 Ibid., p. 128
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., p. 137
26 Ibid., quoting Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 71-72
27 Ibid.
21

22
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protection and promotion of “persons’ capacities for truly human functioning.”28 Buchanan
embraces Nussbaum’s “ten central functional capabilities”29 as conditions to a decent human
life. Nussbaum conceives of these capabilities as including
being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; being able to have
good health, including reproductive health; being able to move freely from place
to place; being able to use the senses, to imagine, to think, and reason; being able
to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; being able to form a
conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of
one’s life; and being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show
concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social
interaction.30
The “capabilities view” outlined by Nussbaum is important to understanding Buchanan’s
own conception of a decent human life because the capabilities view emphasizes the importance
to a decent human life of being able to interact with other humans. Buchanan endorses
Nussbaum’s “capabilities view” in his own account of human rights and their role in a decent
human life because it supplies “crucial content for the idea of treating persons as moral equals”31
in accord with the MEP.
Basic human rights for Buchanan are those “whose violation poses the most serious
threat to the individual’s chances of living a decent human life.”32 Buchanan’s catalogue of basic
human rights includes “the right to life, the right to bodily integrity, the right against torture, the
right of security of person, the right against arbitrary arrest, detention, or imprisonment, the
right to resources of sustenance, and rights of due process.”33 On Buchanan’s account, certain
freedoms are also protected by basic human rights. These include “freedom from religious
persecution and […] the more damaging forms of religious discrimination, freedom of
expression and association,”34 and finally the “right against persecution and against at least the

Ibid.
Ibid.
30 Ibid., p. 137-138
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., p. 129
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
28
29
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more damaging forms of discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity, race, gender or sexual
preference.”35
Ensuring an individual’s best chance at a decent human life does not necessarily entail
equal treatment of persons. A decent human life only requires that the MEP be respected so that
all persons are granted equal moral consideration. A decent human life does not entail the
necessity of equal treatment of persons, only that persons’ interests be equally considered.
Equal consideration of interests is entailed by the MEP’s criterion to treat persons with equal
moral regard. Granting two people equal moral regard does not entail the necessity of the equal
treatment of these two persons. For example, a professor and a graduate student are not treated
equally by their academic department in terms of rank, pay rate, or work load, but they are still
granted equal moral regard in the case where a moral decision must be reached — not to use
either the professor or the graduate student as a means of uncompensated labor. This example is
intended to illustrate Buchanan’s idea that, “the notion of a decent human life does not mandate
anything so strong as equality of treatment, while at the same time emphasizing that it does
place significant restrictions on unequal treatment.”36
1.5

A Natural Duty of Justice
It is clear that Buchanan wants this idealized legal system to rest on moral precepts,

specifically the precepts of justice. In support of this end, Buchanan notes that “taking the MEP
seriously commits us to [a] natural duty of justice.”37 The Natural Duty of Justice (NDJ) holds as
a universal moral obligation and requires us “to treat every person with equal concern and
respect.”38 Furthermore, this duty squares with the MEP because, “a proper understanding of
the MEP implies that to show proper regard for persons we must help ensure that their basic

Ibid.
Ibid., p. 130
37 Ibid., p. 87
38 Ibid., p. 27
35

36
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rights are protected.”39 We can fully discharge the obligations placed on us by the NDJ if we
“help ensure that all persons have access to institutions that protect [their] basic human
rights.”40
The argument for the NDJ, as Buchanan conceives of it, rests on three premises. First,
“all persons are entitled to equal respect or concern.”41 Second, treating persons with equal
respect entails agents’ compliance with an obligation to help “ensure [all persons] are treated
justly where this primarily means helping to make sure that their basic human rights are not
violated.”42 Third, treating persons justly requires the creation and implementation of “just
institutions, including legal institutions.”43 Buchanan’s account of the need to uphold just
institutions as a means of protecting basic human rights is influenced by Rawls’ account, but
departs from it in one significant regard: on Buchanan’s view, “there are principles of justice
that apply directly to individuals.”44 As an example, Buchanan offers the “Natural Duty of
Justice itself which […] directs individuals to contribute to the development of just institutions
where this is needed to ensure that all persons have access to institutions that protect their basic
human rights.”45
By contrast, Rawls’ account of a duty to uphold just institutions holds that “the most
basic principles of justice apply only to institutions or to persons in their institutional roles.”46
1.6

The Role of Just Institutions in State Recognition
Buchanan recognizes that states, more specifically state governments, function as

institutions that ought to protect basic human rights. Accordingly, his idealized account of the
international legal system suggests that the proper goal of the international legal system

Ibid., p. 87
Ibid., p. 27
41 Ibid.; Buchanan notes that, in Kantian terms, all persons are to be treated first as ends in themselves.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., p. 87
46 Ibid., p. 86
39

40
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includes justice, not simply peace or equality among states. He contends that “[t]o participate
without protest in a practice of recognition that empowers governments that engage in
systematic violations of human rights is to be an accomplice to injustice.”47 Buchanan further
argues that, “unless an entity meets certain minimal standards of justice, it ought not to be
regarded as a primary member of international society.”48 That is, if a state does not hold itself
to minimal standards of justice, recognition as legitimate may justifiably be withheld from the
state. He further suggests that a state’s treatment of its people ought to have a greater effect on
that particular state’s ability to create, apply and enforce international law than the specific type
of governance that is practiced by any particular state.49 This is to say that, on Buchanan’s
idealized account, a state that treats its people unjustly to a severe degree (or systematically
violates basic human rights) would not be granted recognition in the international legal order,
thus such a state would not be able to contribute their voice in international institutions. The
effects of removing or denying recognition from a state would extend beyond not having a vote
in matters such as accepting international treaties. Trade and aid that would otherwise be made
available to the state may also be restricted or altogether withheld if a state fails to comply with
human rights norms.
The justice model of state recognition is intended to address a flaw in the equality model
of state recognition that is currently practiced in international law. This flaw is that the equality
model of state recognition wrongly privileges political equality among all states over the moral
equality of persons. If we accept the equality-of-states model, it follows that a state such as
North Korea, whose government regularly violates or altogether thwarts its citizens from
enjoying many of Nussbaum’s capabilities for a characteristically human life, including freedom
of movement and freedom of thought, would have equal voice and vote to Canada, whose
government facilitates all of Nussbaum’s capabilities, when making changes to extant
Ibid., p. 3
Ibid., p. 6
49 Ibid., paraphrase
47

48
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international law. It follows from Buchanan’s view that it is unjustified for North Korea (whose
government routinely violates the human rights of its people) and Canada to have equal political
power in the realm of international law because granting equal legal powers and immunities to
these two states represents a violation of the MEP. The MEP must not be violated.
If Buchanan’s justice-based model of international law were allowed to replace the
current state-centered model, the practice of international law would be closer to achieving
moral soundness than it is at present. Greater moral soundness would be achieved because only
entities which satisfied some minimally moral standard of treatment of their own people would
be granted full access to participate in international legal affairs.
I grant it is a laudable goal to attempt to address this shortcoming in contemporary
international law. If human interests are ignored or otherwise not protected and human rights
are consistently violated by a state, the international legal order is right to withhold recognition
and political participation from that state. Still, Buchanan’s attempt at amending the
shortcoming by requiring states to be democratic is troubling. I address my concern at length in
the chapters to follow but I will gesture to the heart of my concern briefly here. First,
implementing democratic governance in any legitimate state is not the only means by which this
flaw can be adequately addressed. Moreover, in requiring as a pre-condition to recognition that
states to be democratic, Buchanan allows the possibility that the MEP could be violated.
Consider that a hierarchal state which otherwise represented the interests of its people, was
established by the people, and adequately protected the human rights of its people would not be
counted as legitimate on Buchanan’s account simply because it was not constitutional
democracy. Failing to recognize all governments that represent the interests of their people and
otherwise protect human rights as legitimate exposes a shortcoming of Buchanan’s account. He
is right to be concerned to offer a morally founded conception of international law and to
suggest how this account might be best applied. However, in arguing for a human right to
democracy, Buchanan loses sight of his main concern: that states protect basic human rights.

11
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2.1

Considering Democracy as Human Right
Introduction
After outlining who has human rights and which basic interests those human rights are

intended to protect, Buchanan turns his attention to the question of whether people have a
human right to democracy.50 Buchanan defends the position that international law should
require that states be governed democratically; further, he argues that persons possess a basic
human right to democratic participation.51 In this chapter I argue that the foundation for
Buchanan’s claim that persons do, in fact, have a right to democracy, understood as the content
of the “democratic minimum,”52 can be satisfied even in the absence of a fully developed
representative democracy.53
2.2

Justifying a Legal Right to Democracy
Buchanan seeks to establish a practice of international law rooted in moral precepts. If

international law were underscored on these precepts, he believes those precepts would provide
moral support for the inclusion of a particular type of governance as a human right. This form of
governance is a constitutional democracy. Buchanan recognizes that “a moral theory of
international law must answer two questions”54 regarding human rights and governance. The
first asks whether international law should require states to adhere to one particular type of
governance55 as a condition of their legitimacy. The second asks if the legitimacy of the
international legal system itself ought to be contingent on its adherence to a particular form of
governance. Buchanan seeks to answer only one of these questions: what type of governance

Ibid., p. 142 (paraphrase)
Ibid., paraphrase
52 Ibid., p. 145
53 Ibid., p. 147 (paraphrase)
54 Ibid., p. 142
55 Buchanan is concerned to show that this type of governance should be democracy.
50
51
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should be required of a morally ordered international legal system. His answer is elaborated in
his argument for democracy. As he sees it, democracy is, at minimum, a legal human right.
Buchanan offers three arguments in favor of democratic governance as a human right:
the Equal Consideration Argument, the Instrumental Argument, and the Legitimacy Argument.
The Equal Consideration Argument argues for democratic governance as a moral human right.
The argument concludes that only under democratic governance can equal consideration of
persons be realized56. Since equal moral consideration of persons is demanded by the MEP and
the MEP is the foundation for all human rights, if democracy is the only type of governance that
ensures this equal consideration among persons, then democracy itself must be counted as a
human right. According to the Equal Consideration Argument, “equal consideration requires
that all persons have the same fundamental status, as equal participants, in the most important
political decisions in their societies.”57 Further, according to this view, only democracy allows
“the institutional recognition of the equality of persons, […] apart from [the maximization] of
social welfare.”58
The Instrumental Argument is primarily a pragmatic, rather than moral, argument. It
concludes that democracy ought to be required of government because “democratic governance
is the most reliable way of ensuring that human rights properly speaking are respected.”59
According to the Instrumental Argument, democracy functions as a means of accountability for
governments. Buchanan believes the feature of governmental accountability is inherent to
democratic governance. This feature of governmental accountability allows democracy to
function as a safeguard of other human rights. To illustrate the value of the Instrumental
Argument for democracy, Buchanan draws on the example of democracy’s role in famine
prevention first offered by Amartya Sen. Sen shows that fully developed democracies only
experience food shortages rather than famines. Famines, on Sen’s account, are “a purely
Ibid., p. 143 (paraphrase)
Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
56
57
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political phenomenon.”60 Food shortages are not inherently political, but “political
mismanagement” by a state government can exacerbate the problem, creating a famine where
there was originally only a shortage. Buchanan and Sen maintain that law and order break down
when famines occur; thus many human rights are violated during a famine beyond an inability
of governments to satisfy a human right of sustenance. After Buchanan considers Sen’s famine
example, he concludes that “[w]here governments are democratic, they are accountable [to their
people and the international community] , and accountability tends to prevent them from
persisting in the mismanagement that is an essential contributor to the occurrence of famines.”61
Consequently, the Instrumental Argument concludes that even if democracy is not a proper
moral human right it ought to be counted as a legal human right because of the goods it
supports and brings about.
The Legitimacy Argument is an attempt to justify the belief that the primary function of
governments is “to represent or serve as agents of their citizens.”62 It seeks to ensure that “the
international acts of state leaders actually reflect the […] interests of their citizens”.63 Buchanan
contends that this goal of accurate representation can be attained only through implementing
democratic institutions in particular states. Buchanan maintains that “democratic institutions
are necessary […] in international law.”64 The argument concludes “only if governments are
democratic is it appropriate to treat them as agents of their peoples and hence legitimate.”65
Buchanan believes it is a mistake to conclude that these arguments contradict one
another. He understands these three arguments to be compatible and further asserts that
“together they provide strong support for recognizing the right to democratic governance as a
basic human right under international law.”66 Yet, Buchanan focuses his argument for

Ibid.
Ibid., p. 143
62 Ibid., p. 144
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., p. 145
60
61
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democracy as a basic legal human right primarily on the grounds of the instrumental argument.
To this end he suggests that, “if, as the instrumental argument asserts, democratic governance is
the most reliable protector of human rights, then ascribing the right of democratic governance
to individuals as a human right under international law provides important institutional support
for human rights.”67
2.3

The Democratic Minimum
Believing his arguments to have established a human right to democracy, Buchanan now

turns his focus to the proper content of this requirement. As a matter of international human
rights law, each government ought to have the following three characteristics, which collectively
function as “the democratic minimum”68 or “minimal democracy.”69 The minimum serves as a
standard of accountability. Toward describing this accountability, Buchanan offers these three
characteristics.
First, no competent citizen should be excluded from participation in representative,
majoritarian systems for deciding basic laws. Second, such representative, majoritarian systems
ought to be able to remove government officials from any position. Third, citizens ought to have
the freedom to talk about political decisions and form political parties, including the legal ability
to assemble for these purposes. Buchanan also recognizes that majoritarian politics ought not to
be allowed to violate certain basic individual rights.70
2.4

The Role of Accountability in the Democratic Minimum
The notion of accountability is central to Buchanan’s view of state legitimacy.

Accountability is central because he believes only if governments are accountable can they
adequately protect human rights71 and further maintains that only democracies possess each of

Ibid., p. 147
Ibid., p. 145
69 Ibid., p. 147
70 Ibid., p. 146-147
71 Ibid.
67

68
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these characteristics. Buchanan follows the instrumental argument in its assertion that
democratic governance is “the most reliable protector of human rights”, and accordingly, “the
right to democratic governance as having the minimal content [discussed above] ought to be
included in the list of basic human rights in international law.”72 Buchanan argues that since
only constitutional democracies have the characteristics he outlines as necessary for a
government to be substantively accountable, such democracies are superior to other forms of
governance insofar as they are best equipped to protect persons’ basic human rights. Buchanan’s
main concern is that basic human rights be protected and respected, but his focus on democracy
potentially dilutes his concern for the respect and protection of basic human rights.
Returning to the notion of accountability, I agree that accountability to its people is a
necessary feature of governments which adequately protect and respect human rights. However,
I believe that even though Buchanan is right to note this feature’s importance, he conflates the
necessity of accountability in governance with the perceived necessity of democratic governance.
Buchanan repeatedly calls attention to a feature of some democracies which he takes to be a fact
following from all democracies, namely, that democracy serves as the best protection against
violations of other human rights. Buchanan fails to recognize in his discussion that even if he
were correct in this assertion, it does not follow that democracies, in any form are the only
safeguard of other human rights. As one example in illustration of this point consider a system
of governance based on the ideal of consensus.73 Writing about the culture in which he was
raised, Kwasi Wiredu explains that the Akans of West Africa have “what you might call a culture
of consensus.”74 For an Akan, consensus means that theoretical or practical differences between
people do exist but can be reconciled.75 Wiredu asserts that consensus-based governance is
“conducive to the securing of ... the citizen's right of representation with respect to every

Ibid., p. 147
Kwasi Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective (Bloomington and
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996).
74 Ibid., pl 173
75 Ibid.
72
73

16

particular decision – a right which ... is not consistently recognized in majoritarian
democracy.”76 If Wiredu offers an accurate characterization of Akan consensus government, it
seems that this government would both adequately represent the interests of its people and in so
doing also adequately protect and respect the human rights of the people, while at the same time
being non-democratic. This counterexample cannot be addressed by Buchanan’s view as it
stands. Even if Buchanan were to argue that consensus governments constituted democracies he
would have to at least acknowledge that no form of democracy strives to satisfy the interests of
its people in every particular decision it makes. In this regard, the most a democracy can claim
is that it considers persons interests. Still, Buchanan must recognize that consideration of
interests does not necessarily entail that those interests will be meaningfully represented in laws
and practices.
2.5

Considering Rights of Sovereignty
Granting for the moment that governments must both satisfy the democratic minimum

and possess the characteristics of accountability outlined by Buchanan in order to be recognized
as legitimate by the international community, now consider what rights and responsibilities
follow from recognizing state legitimacy. Buchanan suggests that legitimate states have the
limited authority to “specify how human rights norms are applied”77 within its borders.
Buchanan suggests that implementing this requirement would accomplish three important
goals. Those goals are:
“(1) allowing the supremacy of international law to serve as a limit on state
sovereignty for the sake of achieving justice, understood … as the protection of
basic human rights … (2) [creation of] a protected space for diversity in the
institutional implementation of human rights norms … specifically, [allowing that
there would be no requirement of adherence to] one particular conception of
democracy”78 and (3) that the content of human rights claims would remain, at
least to some degree, objectively substantive.79
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That is, Buchanan posits that if states were required to act only in accord with the
requirements of the democratic minimum, human rights claims would be far less likely to be
interpreted or implemented according to a particular government’s subjective view of these
claims. At the same time, Buchanan allows that human rights norms in themselves do not
contain “concrete prescriptions for international design”.80
2.6

Implications of Democracy: A Legal and Moral Human Right
According to Buchanan’s account, the human right to democracy is connected to the

rights of legitimacy and state sovereignty. Further, a state’s having legitimate status is itself a
moral and legal matter. A state must meet legal minimums regarding the treatment of its people
in order to earn recognition as legitimate. If a state is recognized as legitimate, the recognition of
this status (of legitimacy) entails that the international community will respect the state’s
borders, laws, and other decisions. This respect is grounded in the idea of equal consideration
among states, which is justified as an extension of the MEP. Equal treatment among states is
understood as any legitimate state having equal voice to all other legitimate states. On these
grounds, the international community will, out of this respect for the state, allow the state some
degree of participation in international affairs. If a state is recognized as legitimate, the state will
be granted rights of sovereignty by the international community. If a state is granted rights of
sovereignty, the international community will view that state as, practically and for the most
part81, autonomous. That is, as long as the state continues to protect the basic human rights of
its people, the state may conduct its affairs in any way that seems fit in accord with the other
norms of the international community.
Buchanan remains steadfast in his position that democratic governance is the best way
to protect human rights. At the same time Buchanan wants his account of human rights to be
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able to accommodate semi-democratic forms of governance. That is, any state that is operating
as a fledgling or aspiring democracy ought to be protected as well as fully developed democratic
models. To illustrate this point, recall that Buchanan allows for the possibility that states may be
recognized as legitimate even in the case that all states do not practice the same form of
democracy82. The implication of this concession is that newly emerging states, operating under
not yet fully developed democracies, could be recognized as at least provisionally legitimate. If
this implication follows from Buchanan’s concession that any form of minimal democratic
governance could offer sufficient protection of basic human rights, one might worry that a rogue
state could masquerade as democratic while actually operating as a totalitarian regime. In other
words, such a state might mimic democratic requirements while remaining at base,
undemocratic. Any argument entailing a requirement of one particular form of governance over
others will have to address this concern. It is of course possible that any state could masquerade
as practicing one form of governance while actually practicing some other, recognizing this
problem only lends support to my concern. That is, if masquerading as outlined above cannot be
avoided by requiring some form of governance as a condition to a state’s legitimacy, it follows
that the matter of real concern is the protection and respect of human rights, rather than
adherence to a particular form of governance.
I fully answer this worry in the following chapters by arguing, contra Buchanan, that any
form of actually representative governance (including, but not limited to, representative
democracies) ought to be recognized as at least potentially able to adequately protect human
rights just as well as democratic governance.

I want to draw attention to these implications on the basis of Buchanan’s claim that “there is no
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3
3.1

Beitz’s Pragmatic View
Introduction
Although Charles Beitz posits that “the doctrine of human rights is the articulation in the

public morality of world politics of the idea that each person is a subject of global concern”83, he
nonetheless contends that any attempt to justify the normativity of human rights claims on
moral grounds fails. This chapter examines Beitz’ argument in favor of adopting a pragmatic
view toward the practice of human rights and considers the plausibility of his account.
3.2

Beitz’ Rejection of Naturalistic Accounts
Naturalistic accounts take human rights to be a subset of “moral rights” which are

universally held by “all human beings as such or solely in virtue of their humanity.”84 Beitz
suggests that these accounts are mistaken to claim that human rights “express and derive their
authority from some deeper order of values.”85 On the basis of this assumption, naturalistic
accounts maintain that it is permissible to judge “the extent to which the international doctrine
[of human rights] conforms to [this supposed deeper moral order].”86 These approaches cannot
adequately justify the normativity of human rights claims, according to Beitz, because they all
mistakenly presuppose the existence of a deeper moral order to which one’s argument may
rightly appeal. Such accounts fail, in part, because human rights discourse is “an existing
normative practice” and yet naturalism fails to consider the various embodied functions that
“the idea of a human right is meant to play and does play [within] the practice.”87 In criticizing
the practice of human rights on the “basis of a governing conception that does not […] take
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account”88 of these features, all moral accounts amount to insufficient attempts to justify the
normative force of human rights claims.
In an attempt to address the perceived shortcomings of naturalistic accounts, Beitz takes
up the project of exploring, and ultimately endorsing a “practical approach” to addressing the
question of the source of the authority of human rights claims. This position does not appeal to
any deeper moral order. Instead it “exploits the observation that the enterprise of human rights
[exists] within a global practice.”89 The practice operates within the context of the larger
community and provides the content for “a set of norms for the regulation of the behavior of
states.”90 Following Beitz’ argument, if we accept these norms as legitimately constraining
behavior we must also accept that these norms regulate behavior. That is, they also supply
agents with reasons to act. Since Beitz asserts that the practice determines the norms and the
norms apply to behavior, Beitz concludes that the authority of human rights claims is rooted in
the practice itself.
The international practice of human rights has this authority, Beitz contends, because
“its norms seek to protect important human interests against threats of state-sponsored neglect
or oppression.”91 If we accept that human rights norms serve this function, Beitz suggests, “we
have a prima facie reason to regard the practice as valuable.”92 Unlike other fully developed
practices, it is necessary to our understanding of human rights as a practice to recognize that the
practice is emergent and developing rather than constant and mature. As an emergent practice,
the global enterprise of human rights “constitute a set of rules for the regulation of the behavior
of a class of agents”93 each of whom hold some degree of the belief that “these rules ought to be
complied with.”94 In support of this end, “institutions and informal processes” are societally
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upheld for “the propagation and implementation”95 of these rights. As was the case with
Buchanan’s account, according to Beitz’ view “every person has human rights.”96 Moreover,
“responsibilities to respect and protect these rights may, in principle, extend across social and
political boundaries.”97 Accordingly, states play an important role on this account. Namely,
“states are responsible for satisfying certain conditions in the treatment of their own people.”98
In the event that a state falls short of discharging this obligation, the world community is
justified in taking preventative action as an attempt to counteract any further acts of abuse or
neglect by a state. Thus, one purpose of human rights is to serve as “standards for the
governments of states [in the treatment of their people] whose breech is a matter of
international concern.”99 Like Buchanan, Beitz recognizes that human rights ought to reflect
Nussbaum’s conception of human capabilities. He notes Nussbaum’s list of human capabilities
to be “of central importance in any human life.”100 He further follows Buchanan in asserting
these capabilities as “the basis of human rights.”101 Yet, given Beitz’ skepticism toward the
plausibility of a moral grounding for human rights claims, he bases his argument for the
normativity of these claims on a Neo-Rawlsian, rather than a purely ethical framework.
3.3

Human Rights, Rawls’ Account, and Beitz’s Model
One reason Beitz embraces an account of human rights inspired by John Rawls’

conception is that the account recognizes human rights “as one element of a larger conception of
public reason.”102 Beitz understands public reason to represent “shared principles and norms of
which human rights constitute one class.”103 In its recognition of the importance of the role of
public reason, Beitz takes Rawls’ account at least minimally succeeds where naturalistic
Ibid.
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accounts fail because it addresses human rights claims within the global practice, rather than
appealing to their existence and authority in a higher moral order. Beitz further follows Rawls in
his understanding of human rights as “standards whose satisfaction guarantees a society against
external intervention and is necessary for acceptance as a cooperating member of a society.”104
The main shortcoming of Rawls view, as Beitz understands it, is that it does not endorse the full
complement of rights that are stipulated by the main human rights conventions. Beitz endorses
Rawls’ conception of human rights as “a special class of urgent rights […] which are
indispensable to any common good conception of justice.”105 Further, on Rawls’ account these
rights are universal and are “politically significant” in virtue of “their special role in […] public
reason.”106
Beitz reasons that “ although people may disagree about the [proper] content of human
rights, they may agree about the role of human rights in practical reasoning about the conduct of
global political life.”107 Accordingly, Beitz notes that one important aim of human rights
discourse is to attempt to “achieve conditions in which […] peoples can engage peacefully while
determining their own individual futures free from the interference of other [outside
sources].”108 In light of this understanding of the role of human rights within global discourse,
Beitz disagrees with Buchanan in an additional and salient regard. Where Buchanan argues that
democratic governance ought to be protected by a human right, Beitz contends that the “proper
scope of human rights requires international toleration.”109 It is a matter of primary importance
and a necessary condition to a state’s legitimacy that human rights standards be respected and
upheld in any given state. However, Beitz recognizes what Buchanan does not; namely that
democracy in addition to other forms of governance can and do adequately protect and respect
human rights. Thus, if there is a human right to governance, that right should be extended to
Ibid., p. 100
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include any non-democratic forms of governance that otherwise protect and respect human
rights. If the primary purpose of human rights is to protect human interests, and in so doing to
regard persons as subjects of primary moral concern, then to not recognize certain nondemocracies as legitimate in this regard undermines this purpose.
3.4

A Further Discussion of Democracy
Beitz maintains democracy is not the only form of governance that encourages people’s

political awareness and involvement, or that rewards critical participation in public life.
Economic stability and relative affluence are two factors that will contribute to the success or
failure of attempts to implement democratic regimes in states, as will the degree to which a
particular democratic regime is developed.110 In considering these practical attributes of states,
it seems fair to conclude that developing or stalled democracies should not be preferred over
other types of non-democratic governance. Preferred status should potentially be withheld from
democracies because, if restricted by severely limited resources, democracies and other forms of
governance perform equally, in terms of protecting persons’ other basic interests. Given this
information, if Buchanan were to respond to Beitz on this point he would have to argue that he
envisions some idealized and otherwise fully developed form of democracy as being eligible for
protection by a human right. Nonetheless, Buchanan’s account is flawed in its discussion of
democracy as a human right at least to the extent that his discussion does little if anything to
address how his account can be applied to developing but not yet fully developed democracies.
In championing toleration of various governances and focusing primarily on protection of
human rights, Beitz’ account is more fully satisfactory as compared to Buchanan’s.
In an attempt to address the concern that democratic governance is too narrow to be
protected by a corresponding human right, Beitz suggests that there instead be a political right
to self-determination. Such a right would be held by states, some of which might be
democracies. Accepting a model of collective self-determination also means that if international
110
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law includes a human right to governance, when a non-democratic form of governance would
better protect persons’ other interests, a human right would also protect that form of
governance, provided other conditions were met. For Beitz, a society ought to be considered selfdetermining if it satisfies three conditions: first, that “political decisions result from, and are
accountable to, a process in which everyone’s interests are represented”; second, that all persons
have “rights of dissent”; and third, that “public officials explain their decisions in terms of a
widely held conception of the common good.”111 According to this model, any political regime
that is “decent” in Rawls’ sense ought to be protected by the right to self-determination.
A decent society, in Rawls’ sense, is one that protects some conception of human rights,
engages in “genuine cooperative schemes”, and operates on a “common good conception of
justice” according to which “public institutions must express the principle that the good of every
member of society counts.” 112 Additionally, decent societies are structured in accordance with
principles that would be embraced by reasonable people. Reasonable people acknowledge the
burdens of judgment and are willing to propose and accept fair terms of cooperation for their
society while at the same time not imposing their particular conception of the good on any other
society.113 Counting any decent society as self-determining entails both non-interference and
political recognition under international law, regardless of the particular type of governance
practiced in that society. The political right to self-determination, then, should be understood as
more inclusive than a right only to democratic governance.
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4

The Need For a Moral and Practical Foundation

4.1

Introduction
In this chapter I argue that neither a moral nor a practical account of the normativity of

human rights claims can stand on its own as a fully developed justification. I argue that these
two underpinnings—moral and practical—must be taken together to fully underscore human
rights’ normative force on agents. Further, I suggest that while a moral foundation is necessary
to properly ground human rights claims, the MEP cannot be used to justify a human right to
democracy. I argue that any human right related to forms of government must not rule out any
form of governance a priori, but should instead require that the government of every state need
not conform to the requirements of democracy. What should be required of state governments is
an ability to adequately represent the interests of its people and not otherwise violate human
rights.
4.2

Beitz’s Rejection of Morally Grounded Naturalistic Accounts of Human
Rights
While Beitz recognizes that human rights doctrine constitutes a “common moral

language [in the] public discourse of peacetime global society,”114 he at the same time maintains
that the normative force of such rights cannot be justified by appeals to any naturalistic account.
Naturalistic accounts maintain that the normative force of human rights claims is best
understood as a product of their place in a higher moral order. Further, such accounts hold that
persons’ and their interests have value in their own right, as such. Beitz maintains that no moral
account can sufficiently justify the normative force of human rights claims because no particular
moral account is sufficiently broad to be found acceptable by all persons to whom it may apply.
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In support of this belief, Beitz attempts to argue that the framers of human rights
doctrine “aspired to a [offer] a doctrine that could be embraced from many [moral and political]
points of view.”115 Beitz embraces such an account because he believes only a broad account can
adequately serve as a basis for human rights claims even in light of wide moral disagreement
among the world’s cultures. Moreover, Beitz suggests that moral accounts that attempt to justify
the normativity of human rights claims cannot be successful in this undertaking, because such
accounts fail to recognize that such claims are embodied components of an emergent practice.
As a practice, human rights claims “consist of a set of rules for the regulation of the behavior of a
class of agents” who hold varying degrees of a “widespread belief that these rules ought to be
complied with.”116 Moreover, this belief informs the conduct of institutions and societal
processes in an attempt to ensure that human rights ideals are upheld. The practice is emergent
because in the case of human rights “these dimensions are less fully developed than in mature
practices.”117 Instead of embracing a naturalistic view, he suggests we cannot begin to
understand the content of human rights claims on the basis of appeals to their place in a deeper
moral order “without any reference to [their] role in global political life.”118 Accordingly, he
suggests that a different type of account is needed to understand why human rights claims levy
normative force on agents, giving those agents reasons to act in accord with the demands of a
human rights claim.
In rejecting naturalistic accounts, Beitz argues that human rights claims ought to be
justified by the fact that these rights play an important role in global discourse. Beitz takes his
account to be a practical account, one which attempts to understand human rights in the context
of their role in a larger global practice. Their role is to function as a “set of norms for the
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regulation of the behavior of states.”119 However, rights cannot serve this purpose unless the
global community recognizes “the practice’s norms as reason-giving”120 for the relevant agents.
One complication arises when we realize that although human rights claims function as
normative constraints, there may still be disagreement within the community regarding the
scope, content, and weight of human rights claims in the overall discourse. This complication
must be addressed by any successful account of human rights that aspires to be action-guiding
for the agents to which it applies. Beitz believes that his pragmatic account can satisfactorily
answer the indeterminacy concern because, within the global community, the practice itself is
recognized as providing agents with a set of reason giving norms which agents are to take as
reasons in their deliberations about how to act121. I contend that this account does not supply
compelling reasons to accept it. If the practice’s norms are to be reasons which guide agents
actions, the practice cannot ground itself. The normative force of the practice must come from
some source outside itself otherwise, the practice risks susceptibility to relativism over time.
Given these indeterminacies and potential tensions, it is difficult for either Beitz’ or Buchanan’s
account to discern how to best apply human rights claims in many particular situations.
A naturalistic account, such as Buchanan’s, must also address these tensions, but it may
do so by appealing to the underlying moral value or worth inherent to all persons as such.
Consequently, one benefit of adopting a morally based naturalistic account is that the
normativity of human rights claims originates from outside itself, thus, such accounts are
potentially less likely to be negatively affected by appeals to relativistic values. However,
considered in isolation of practical application, naturalistic morally grounded accounts are too
abstract to address the questions left by the indeterminacy concern. Such accounts could be
bolstered if they were considered in conjunction with Beitz’ pragmatic account. The benefit of a
morally grounded naturalistic account is that it grounds the normativity of human rights claims
Ibid., p. 8
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outside the practice itself. But this approach alone cannot fully justify human rights’ normative
force. A complete account of human rights normativity must both be grounded outside of itself
and acknowledge human rights place and function within the global practice. Beitz’s practical
account maintains that the global practice itself grounds the authority possessed by human
rights claims. Beitz argues that the global practice that encompasses human rights claims
endows these claims with authority. Since human rights norms “seek to protect important
human interests against state sponsored neglect or oppression,” Beitz maintains persons have “a
prima facie reason to regard the practice […] as valuable.”122 On Beitz’s account, the demands of
human rights claims affect many agents. The pragmatic account also cannot stand on its own as
a full account of the normative force of human rights claims. A moral underpinning is needed to
help ensure that the power of the practice does not silence the possibility of the authority of a
moral foundation. I do not mean to suggest, however, that a moral foundation is sufficient to
understand the source of the authority of human rights claims. What I do mean to suggest is
that only a moral foundation married to a pragmatic account can fully address the question of
the source of the normative force of human rights claims.
Beitz and Buchanan agree that human rights are intended to protect important human
interests. However, one salient difference between their accounts is the central role of states in
Beitz’s view of human rights practice. That is, for Beitz human rights primarily serve as
regulations on the actions and behaviors of states and their agents “in the treatment of their own
people.”123 States and their agents are most deeply obligated by human rights claims because,
from a practical perspective, states have the greatest opportunity and resources available to
uphold human rights, and the practice holds states accountable. If states fall short of satisfying
the obligations levied on them by human rights claims, the world community is justified in
taking “preventative action”124 in an attempt to restore respect and protection of human rights in
Ibid. (emphasis mine)
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accord with the idea that “each person is a subject of global concern.”125 In this regard, states
have a duty to address the correlative obligations carried by human rights claims. This duty is so
compelling that failure by a state to satisfy these obligations may result in the world
community’s overriding that state’s sovereignty. Thus, while Beitz contends that the state serves
as the “basic unit” responsible for the protection of human rights, he also recognizes that the
obligation to treat each person’s rights as a matter of global concern is so great that it supersedes
all other competing considerations, even state sovereignty. Buchanan’s account too, recognizes
that states play an important role in upholding human rights claims but unlike Beitz’ account,
Buchanan’s allows that not all duties related to the protection of human rights fail immediately
or primarily to states. Rather, Buchanan allows that some such duties rest with people (consider
as an example the Natural Duty of Justice) while others rest with people and with states. Even
given this difference, like Buchanan126, Beitz acknowledges that the responsibility to protect and
respect rights, “may, in principle, extend across social and political boundaries.”127 This practical
account grants that the practice of human rights discourse has a broad scope and takes the
“central concern” of the practice to be the protection of “individuals from the consequences and
omissions of their governments.” On this account, human rights correspond to a wide array of
interests persons may have. Further, the interests human rights purport to protect ought to be
protected as a measure of respect and protection of the “equal dignity of all persons.”128
4.3

Beitz’s Neo-Rawlsian Approach to Human Rights
Beitz’s account of the normativity of human rights claims places a considerable amount

of weight on human rights’ perceived role in global practice and seeks to offer an account that
accurately reflects the extant practice of international law. To this end, he adopts a modified
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idea of Rawls’ conception of a “society of decent peoples”129 to serve as a model for his own
partially idealized account of the practice. Beitz believes that such a model can adequately justify
the normativity of human rights claims while avoiding many problems morally grounded
accounts cannot satisfactorily address. In addition, Beitz takes this account to partially alleviate
one of the main tensions in the global practice, namely, the lack of agreement among people
regarding the content of human rights claims. Beitz suggests that while people may disagree
considerably about the proper “content of human rights claims, […] they may agree about the
role of human rights in the practical reasoning [which guides] the conduct of global political
life.”130 Beitz embraces a neo-Rawlsian view of human rights practice because, in at least the
idealized case of liberal or decent peoples, human rights are recognized as “part of the public
reason of international society.”131 He also endorses the purported aim of a society of liberal and
decent peoples, which he understands as attempting “to achieve conditions in which different
peoples can engage [with one another] peacefully” while at the same time “determining their
own individual futures free from the interference of others.”132 Adopting this position and
applying it to the practice of international law would facilitate and protect the pluralism of views
represented in the practice. However, in an effort to offer an account that accurately represents
the contemporary practice of human rights, Beitz does not simply endorse Rawls’ view as it
stands. Rather, he is critical of Rawls’ account insofar as its catalog of rights does not fully reflect
those rights protected by international law.
Beitz’s model presupposes that human rights function in part as institutional protections
of “urgent interests”133 or standard threats. Urgent interests represent those interests that are
“recognized as important in a wide range of lives.”134 The obligations entailed by protecting
human rights apply to states’ conduct towards its people. Accordingly, respect for human rights
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must be reflected in a state’s laws and public policies. Finally, Beitz’s model takes human rights’
protection as a matter of international concern because all persons must be treated as “subjects
of global concern.”135 If states fail to treat their people in this regard, outside intervention by the
global community is justified. However, even though states’ actions towards their people are
regulated by human rights norms, Beitz does recognize that “governments have limited
discretion to choose the means to carry out these requirements.”136
Beitz’s pragmatic account is not without its merits. Beitz is right to insist that a fully
robust account of human rights must address the extant state of the global practice. Further, he
is right to attempt to provide an account of the normativity of human rights claims that stresses
the necessity of protecting all persons’ urgent interests. He also properly situates all persons as
“subjects of international concern” and is right to recognize that the protection of persons’ most
urgent interests justifies the existence of corresponding human rights in international law.
However, Beitz is mistaken to insist that the normativity of human rights claims can be
fully justified without any moral underpinnings. Recall that Beitz contends that “human beings
are subjects of international concern.”137 Treating persons in light of this fact requires that
human rights be in place to protect at least persons’ urgent interests. Beitz further asserts that
“international recognition of human rights is necessary to protect the equal dignity of all
persons.” Seeing persons as subjects of international concern is a moral underpinning as is
protecting their urgent interests with human rights out of concern to protect the equal dignity of
persons. Beitz account is weakened because of his failure to recognize that his pragmatic view is
itself morally underscored. Beitz attempts to justify the need to protect the equal dignity of
persons on the grounds that “equal human dignity is a value in its own right.”138 Yet, simply
claiming that equal human dignity is a value in its own right that must be protected if persons
are to be recognized as subjects of global concern is not a satisfactory justification for this claim.
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If persons have equal dignity, then this dignity must originate from some underlying value
possessed by all persons. Equal human dignity cannot be adequately explained as “a value in its
own right,”139 because all values must have some grounding source. Appealing to equal human
dignity may sufficiently account for the source of human rights claims normativity. Thus, equal
human dignity may be the grounding source of human rights claims. Further, I contend that
human dignity is the root source of the value of human rights claims and that equal human
dignity is, in fact, the only basic value. If we do not accept my view and instead allow Beitz
argument for equal human dignity as a value in its own right to stand, there will be an
expanatory gap present in Beitz’ account. Beitz must more fully account for the appeal to human
dignity his account relies on. If he cannot supply a satisfactory argument for accepting equal
human dignity as the source of the normativity of human rights claims, the explanatory gap will
remain. Its presence in Beitz’ account suggests that a pragmatic account of the normativity of
human rights claims cannot serve on its own as a complete justification of human rights
purported normative force on agents. A moral foundation is also needed.
4.4

Embracing a Naturalistic Account
Buchanan’s idealized vision of a morally grounded system of international law can

provide the content of a moral foundation. Buchanan is right to attempt to construct a morally
underpinned idealized conception of international law with justice at its core. By seating justice
at the center of his idealized account, Buchanan is able to make the case that protection of
human rights is an essential element of treating persons justly. Accordingly, Buchanan argues,
“the moral foundation for the international legal order is [all agents’] limited obligation to help
ensure that all persons have access to [just] institutions—those that protect basic human
rights.”140 By morally grounding international law, Buchanan is able to offer an account of
human rights founded on human dignity. The source of the value of equal human dignity is the
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underlying moral value of all human beings. Buchanan’s account is strengthened in recognizing
this connection, while Beitz’ account is weakened at least insofar as it fails to recognize this
moral underpinning, while at the same time relying on it to further the argument.
On Buchanan’s account, the moral status of persons supplies the authority of at least
moral human rights claims while also carrying “especially weighty” moral obligations. One such
obligation is to “treat every person with equal concern and respect.”141 Buchanan refers to this
obligation when he appeals to the Moral Equality Principle (MEP). Since Buchanan classifies
human rights as a sub-set of moral claim rights, he believes that the MEP applies when human
rights are protected. Recall that Buchanan distinguishes between moral human rights and legal
human rights. While noting that these two types of rights may not hold a one-to-one
correspondence to each other, he stresses that legal human rights must square with moral
principles, namely principles of justice. Toward this end, even legal human rights are minimally
morally constrained, according to Buchanan’s account. Moral human rights are possessed by
human beings in virtue of their status as persons, regardless of whether or not these rights are
enshrined in legal sanctions. Taken as a moral obligation, the MEP requires that all persons be
granted equal consideration. Equal consideration does not entail equal treatment of persons;
rather, it only requires that all persons’ interests be considered equally. Buchanan contends that
there is some subset of interests basic to all persons. His conception of this list mirrors the set of
interests Beitz refers to as urgent. On both accounts, basic or urgent interests are those that
must be protected as a matter of ensuring an individual’s best chance at living a decent human
life.
Buchanan is correct to call attention to persons’ inherent moral worth as a means of
explaining why persons have human rights and corresponding obligations. Further, if we hope
to give a full and satisfactory account of the normative force of human rights claims on agents’
actions, we should merge these accounts. Buchanan’s account as it stands cannot be the proper
141
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moral account to underpin the normative force of human rights claims because he overextends
his moral account of international law when he attempts to argue that democratic governance is
itself a moral obligation. Buchanan is rightly concerned to offer a morally grounded account of
international law that prioritizes protecting basic human rights. As I have shown, democratic
governance is not a necessary condition to the protection of these rights. Further, if a legal
human right enshrines democratic governance and no other forms, the MEP is effectively
violated because at least some persons’ interests would not be equally considered. When I speak
of consideration of a person’s interests, I take that term to require that their interests not be
excluded a priori from the realm of possibility. A nation whose people voted to install or affirm a
monarchy would ironically be deemed a non-legitimate state if its government took the form for
which its people voted. The right of that nation’s people under the MEP to equal consideration
would be violated if democracy were considered a human right.
Buchanan is mistaken to adulterate his morally grounded account of international law by
insisting that democracy be the sole form of governance that is eligible for protection by a
human right. Buchanan makes several arguments in support of his belief that a human right to
democracy ought to be included in any corpus of human rights, but none of these arguments
adequately justifies this belief. First, Buchanan appeals to a simple pragmatic argument in favor
of including minimal constitutional democracy among a list of human rights. He claims, “we […]
know enough about human beings and institutions to be fairly confident that what might be
called minimal constitutional democracy is generally the most reliable political institutional
arrangement for protecting basic human rights.”142 While this claim might be empirically true,
as formulated by Buchanan it represents fallacious reasoning. That is to say, even if it is the case
that minimal constitutional democracies are consistently correlated with the protection of other
human rights in many circumstances, it does not follow that there should be a human right to
democratic governance.
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The Instrumental Argument for democracy hinges on the idea that “where governments
are democratic they are accountable, and accountability tends to prevent [governments] from
persisting in the mismanagement that is an essential contributor to […] the breakdown of law
and order”143 that often accompanies human rights violations. Note that Buchanan’s pressing
concern in this argument is that human rights not be violated. Granting Buchanan’s premise
that accountable governments are far less likely to engage in systematic and persistent human
rights violations does not show that only democracy can facilitate or mandate this
accountability.
Other forms of governance may safeguard against human rights violations at least as well
as democracy, or at least sufficiently well. For example, Rawls suggests that constitutional
monarchies may be able to serve in this way144. Additionally, some forms of consensus-based
governance are not constitutional democracies but are arguably adequate to protect and respect
persons other human rights145. Thus, the instrumental argument in favor of a human right to
democracy contains a critical flaw that Buchanan must repair if he is to rescue his argument.
The most that this argument can prove is that democracy is usually the best means of protecting
other human rights, not that this is always so. That is, even if democracies are in fact the most
reliable form of government for protecting human rights, it still does not follow that other
governments cannot adequately protect human rights. However, Buchanan ought to be
concerned to protect any form of governance that can be shown to act as a sufficient protector of
human rights, and is thus mistaken to privilege democracy on this count.
Next, Buchanan turns to the legitimacy argument in favor of including democratic
governance among the institutions that ought to be protected by a human right. The legitimacy
argument presupposes that the primary purpose of a state is to act as an agent of its peoples.
Even granting this premise, Buchanan cannot show that only or all democratic states act as
Ibid., p. 143
Ibid., p. 99 (paraphrase)
145 Kwasi Wiredu (p. 173) speaks of one such circumstance in recalling the culture in which he was raised.
He classifies this form of governance as Akan consensus.
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agents of their peoples. A government need not have been installed through an election in order
to represent the interests of its people. For example, a competent monarch can represent her
people and their interests; that she will do so is not guaranteed by monarchy—but neither does
democracy guarantee that the state will represent the long-term interests of its people rather
than the short-term interests of officials who are running for reelection and whose livelihoods
depend on campaign contributions. To be clear, what this example highlights is that the
Legitimacy Argument depends on an assumption that every state with that form of government
tends to conduct itself in ways conducive to human rights simply by virtue of that government’s
structure. Hence, the Legitimacy argument too, fails. The most we can derive on the basis of the
Legitimacy argument is that democracy is usually the best form of government insofar as it acts
as an agent of its peoples’ interests, not that this is always so. The Legitimacy Argument does not
show democratic governance to be unique in its ability to uphold this requirement. Accordingly,
democracy may not be counted as a human right on the basis of this argument either.
Finally, Buchanan makes an argument that democracy must be included in the list of
human rights because democracy is grounded in the equal consideration of persons. If
Buchanan can successfully deliver this argument, he will have also shown that the MEP requires
that governments be democratic. Buchanan here overlooks the flaws of some democracies and
the strengths of some other forms of governance. It is not the case that democracies necessarily
grant all persons as equal consideration in governmental participation; some mentally
competent adult citizens are entirely excluded from participation in some Western democracies
subsequent to being imprisoned for a serious crime. The United Kingdom’s ban on prisoners
voting in parliamentary elections while they remain imprisoned has drawn the censure of the
European Court of Human Rights146 , and the United States does not even automatically restore
voting rights after a felon has served their full sentence. On the other hand, a consensus-based
form of governance—in which all reasonable objections must be addressed—can do more to
146
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uphold the right of participation for those who hold a minority opinion. Majoritarian democracy
permits the opinion of 49% of a state’s citizens to be utterly ignored if the other 51% so agree.
Buchanan’s argument fails because democracy is not the only form of governance that upholds
the Moral Equality Principle. That is, the structure of a practice may serve as a means of
understanding why human rights must be morally grounded. Nonetheless, this understanding
does not entail that democracy is necessary in order to uphold human rights.
4.5

Conclusion
Buchanan’s main aim in offering a morally grounded foundation of international law is

to ensure that human rights are not violated. In light of the flaws present in each of Buchanan’s
arguments for democracy, I think Buchanan’s account ought to allow any form of governance
that otherwise adequately protects and respects human rights. Privileging any single form of
governance as a precondition of recognition as a legitimate state does not honor all persons’
right of equal consideration. Accordingly, no one form of governance should be unilaterally
protected by a human right and required of states seeking recognition as legitimate. Instead, any
form of governance that can be shown to adequately protect and respect human rights ought to
be upheld as satisfying a requirement toward recognition.
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